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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine whether there is an “ideal” level of financial development, somewhere 
between financial capital overaccumulation and financial capital underaccumulation.   We construct 
indexes of non-bank or speculative financial development, financial (bank) deepening, and production.  
We find that financial deepening does support what we dub the “speculative spread,” that is, the 
difference between non-bank or speculative finance and real production.  As financial deepening grows, 
the speculative spread may grow in step.  Where the speculative spread exceeds deepening, financial 
instability may occur.  Hence financial deepening may promote or constrain economic development. 
Introduction 
The literature on the relationship between finance and growth has asked several important questions 
over the decades: first and foremost, it has asked whether financial development is important for 
growth.  Second, it has asked whether the type of financial structure matters for economic growth and 
development.  Third, it has asked whether the magnitude of financial investment is important to growth.  
Fourth, it has asked how the order of financial development affects economic growth.   
For the most part, there has been a consensus that financial development at the macroeconomic level is 
important for growth, and, at the other end, many economists, particularly those who study financial 
crises, believe that financial liberalization at an early level of economic development can arrest growth2.  
However, an important question remains: what is the optimal level of financial development for 
economic growth, in both developed and developing countries?    The study of speculative bubbles has 
shown that finance can arrest growth, creating a crisis when the bubble bursts, but it has not been 
shown outside of the literature on speculative finance and that on capital overaccumulation that 
financial development can become “too” large for the level of economic growth.  In this paper, we test 
the hypothesis that there is an “ideal” level of financial development for the level of economic 
development that is best for stable economic growth. 
                                                          
1
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 Klein and Olivei (1999)  find, in an empirical test, that financial liberalization between 1986 and 1995 resulted in 
financial deepening for developed countries, but did not result in increased financial deepening for developing 
countries. 
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The paper is structured as follows: Section One examines existing literature on the relationship between 
finance and growth.  Section Two critically reviews a variety of theoretical precursors: Marx’s 
overaccumulation of capital theory, the Harrod-Domar model, the “golden age” growth model of Phelps 
and others, and the overlapping generations model.  Section Three operationalizes our hypothesis that 
non-bank financial development and financial deepening (measured largely through bank activity) are 
intricately connected through the productive capacity of the economy.  Section Four tests the 
hypothesis and discusses the significance of our findings.  Section Five concludes. 
Section One.  Literature on finance, development, and overaccumulation 
Finance and development 
Financial deepening has mainly been defined in the literature in terms of development of the private 
banking sector.  Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) initiated the literature on 
financial deepening and its role in economic development.  Goldsmith, studying 35 countries, found that 
on average periods of economic growth over time were accompanied by financial development.  
McKinnon viewed finance as easing constraints to production, as a bridge between entrepreneurship or 
productivity and growth.   Finance would increase the efficiency of capital and reduce fragmentation, in 
which profit rates varied greatly throughout the economy. 
The financial deepening literature has evolved over time.  The literature inspired by McKinnon and Shaw 
is labeled “supply-leading” financial deepening theory, in which financial deepening produces economic 
development, while that illustrated by Ireland (1994) is called “demand-leading,” in which economic 
development creates financial deepening.   The argument in demand-leading theory was that as an 
economy grows and expands technologically, productive processes require additional financial resources.  
Financial development follows productivity.  McKinnon, however, argued that in developing countries, 
traditional technology businesses often coexist with more modern businesses, making an allocation of 
financial subsidies to an industry as a whole inappropriate for efficient allocation of capital, since the 
traditional or the modern business may in fact be more productive.  In his mind, economic development 
did not necessarily drive financial development at lower levels of production.  And in fact, most scholars 
take the supply-leading view (Fritz 1984).  Importantly, Gurley and Shaw (1960) state “…net output 
capacity depends only partly on the level of investment.  It depends also on the efficient allocation of 
investment among alternative capital projects.” 
Levine (1997) provides an extensive literature review on the empirical relationship between finance and 
growth, and asserts a positive and first-order relationship between the two.  Levine writes that the level 
of financial development likely influences not only the present level of economic growth, but also future 
economic growth and capital accumulation.  Financial markets reduce market frictions such as 
information and transactions costs, and mobilize and allocate financial resources in an economy.  
Economic growth also affects financial development by expanding the introduction and advancement of 
financial institutions, but most literature has examined the effect of financial development on growth.   
King and Levine (1993a, 1993b, 1993c), examining 80 countries between 1960 and 1989, finding that 
there is a strong positive relationship between financial development and growth.  Financial 
 3 
 
development indicators include the size of financial intermediaries, the degree to which the central bank 
versus commercial banks allocate credit, the percentage of credit allocated that is private, and the ratio 
of credit to private enterprises to GDP.  Growth indicators include real per capita GDP growth, capital 
accumulation, and productivity growth.  Financial depth in 1960, the authors find, is significantly 
correlated to each of the averaged growth indicators. King and Levine (1993c) also show that financial 
systems that allow for risk diversification accelerate technological change and economic growth.  
Bencivenga and Smith (1992) write of the “optimal” level of financial repression in the context of an 
economy that must monetize its deficit, modeling the optimal level of repression through high reserve 
requirements or deposit interest rate ceilings using an overlapping generations model.  The paper 
formalizes McKinnon’s (1982) discussion regarding the importance of the order of financial liberalization, 
emphasizing the necessity of changing fiscal policy before financial liberalization takes place.  Roubini 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992) also model financial repression and long term growth, showing that 
governments that repress the financial sector in order to delivery inflationary revenues from an 
increased demand for money affect growth negatively. 
Financial stability, as a general concept, has also been regarded as an important precursor to economic 
growth.  Bernanke and Gertler (1990) construct a model in which financial instability creates high agency 
costs, resulting in low and inefficient investment.  Bernanke and Gertler define financial instability at the 
micro level, occurring when a borrower can contribute less of his own funding to an investment project 
while holding more information about the project than the lender.  The interests of borrower and lender 
diverge, creating agency costs.  This leads to poor investment performance and hence to poor economic 
performance. 
Unlike most of the financial deepening literature, Arestis and Demetriades (1997) include indicators of 
stock market development.  By contrast to King and Levine (1993a, 1993b, 1993c), Arestis and 
Demetriades (1997) use time-series regression analysis to find that the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth is quite variable by country; the relationship cannot be generalized.  
The authors believe their results are better substantiated than cross-country regressions since time-
series analysis captures more robustly the relationship between contemporaneous or lagged indicators 
and the dependent variable.  Arestis and Demetriades find that the relationship between 
contemporaneous financial development and economic growth is much stronger than that between 
lagged financial development and economic growth, contradicting King and Levine’s finding, in their 
cross country regression, that financial development leads economic growth3.    
But it could very well be that Arestis and Demetriades’ (1997) results are different because they include 
indicators of stock market development, which behaves quite differently than but in conjunction with 
bank development.  In this paper, we find that bank financial development aids the development of 
non-bank (including stock market) financial development as it relates to production, which we refer to 
                                                          
3
 The debate continued with Levine, Loyaza, and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine, and Loyaza (2000), who take into 
account the issue of simultaneity of regressors.  Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) attempt to resolve technical 
issues by accounting for both issues of simultaneity of regressors and issues of integration and cointegration of the 
data, finding that indeed, financial deepening does impact economic growth in the long run. 
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as the ‘speculative wedge.’  We argue that a divergence of non-bank financial development as it relates 
to production from bank financial development results in overaccumulation of financial capital. 
Overaccumulation of capital 
The concept of capital overaccumulation, or divergence from a stable growth path, was first put forth by 
Marx, who described overaccumulation as a situation in which capitalists incorporate so much capital 
into the production process that the workers cannot purchase the goods produced.   Later, Keynes also 
noted that the economy did not necessarily tend toward equilibrium in which neither overaccumulation 
nor underaccumulation of capital occurs.  Refuting Say’s Law, in which supply creates its own demand, 
Keynes found that crises of effective demand were real phenomena. 
Overaccumulation of capital was considered in models that followed Keynes.  Stability in economic 
growth was much more limited in these models, which assumed the economy could move away from 
“steady state” growth.  This group of models includes the Harrod-Domar model and the “golden age” 
growth model of Phelps and others, including Robinson.  The overlapping generations model, although 
neoclassical rather than Keynesian in methodology, also assumes the possibility of overaccumulation. 
In the Harrod-Domar model, a particular level of investment was required for long-run capital outlay, 
and it was possible for the actual long run growth rate to diverge from stability.  Besomi (2001) stresses 
that Harrod’s original model was nonlinear, and based on changes in the business cycle, which also 
translated into long-run growth.  But no matter; the fact was that the actual growth rate might diverge 
from the warranted growth rate, and the economy could become trapped in a cycle that required 
continuing further investment. 
The “golden age” growth model was drawn up separately by several economists, here represented by 
Edmund Phelps.  Phelps (1961) writes: 
If there exists a golden-age growth path on which the social net rate of return to 
investment equals the rate of growth (hence, in one class of models, the fraction of 
output saved equals the capital elasticity of output)-or, in market terms, a golden-age 
path on which the competitive interest rate equals the growth rate and hence gross 
investment equals the gross competitive earnings of capital-then this golden age 
produces a path of consumption which is uniformly higher than the consumption path 
associated with any other golden age. 
The “golden age growth path” is the most efficient growth path the economy may take (Phelps 1965).  
Phelps (1962) writes that the elasticity of the maximum path of growth to the investment ratio depends 
only on the capital elasticity of output. 
Another type of ideal capital accumulation model is the neoclassical overlapping generations model, 
which is based on household and firm decisions which determine the size of the capital stock.  The 
models were developed by Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965), who assumed that 
individuals live two periods, and by Diamond (1965), who assumed that new households could 
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continually enter the economy (Romer 2001).  Overlapping generations models also make use of the 
“golden rule” of capital accumulation, such that the amount of capital in the next period is some 
function of the current level of capital.   
Later neoclassical growth models did not allow for instability based on an ideal level of capital 
accumulation.  In both exogenous and endogenous models, overaccumulation of capital resulted simply 
in the return to equlibrium.  For example, in the Solow model, both capital and output in their steady 
state were determined endogenously at the equilibrium level.  Exogenous neoclassical models have 
been critiqued by Garegnani (1984) and Harris (1970) for attributing inefficiencies to market 
inefficiencies, since the marginal product of capital equals the profit rate, both of which face decreasing 
returns.  Hence persistent problems of unemployment, due to Keynesian shortage of effective demand, 
or problems of obtaining surplus value in the Marxist vein, have been increasingly neglected since the 
advent of the Solow model in 1956.  Kaldor (1977) also sharply criticized the exogenous neoclassical 
model for implying that increasing the capital to labor ratio would increase the capital to output ratio, 
when he mainly attributed economic growth to increasing returns found in larger economies.   
Endogenous growth models, introduced by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986), among others, set out to 
address some of these issues4.  Endogenous growth models, which allow the marginal product of capital 
to increase over time, face their own shortcomings; these models continue to preserve some of the 
basic assumptions of neoclassical economics that were criticized for their lack of realism in the 
exogenous models that preceded them.   Long run growth is independent of the structural 
characteristics of the economy (Aghion and Howitt 1998), and capital overaccumulation is not possible. 
McKinnon (1973), a founder of financial deepening theory, was not persuaded by the golden rule of 
growth, noting that in this type of model, “the life of monetary authorities is indeed idyllic (and perhaps 
a bit dull) with only a little more effort required on the fiscal side to keep the rate of aggregate 
investment properly adjusted.  The banking-monetary system has no particular role to play in the 
process of capital accumulation, even though bankers and their public relations officers may have 
persuaded people otherwise.”  The neoclassical model overall, he writes, leaves out proper 
consideration of the monetary system, and leads one to conclude that monetary policy is independent 
of the private savings rate and that money demand cannot be determined. 
Although the work on capital overaccumulation inspired our current thesis, prior growth models focused 
on physical capital overaccumulation, while we focus on financial capital overaccumulation.  Some work 
on financial capital overaccumulation has been done, but not much.  Bello (2006) writes about financial 
overaccumulation in the sense that profitability of the financial sector rises far above the real (not stock 
inflated) profitability of the manufacturing and industrial sector.  Investment may be incorporated into 
physical capital or goods, but if it is not used, where there is a lack of demand, profitability fails to result.  
Therefore, finance has created what Bello calls “superficial boom[s]” in the developed world. 
                                                          
4
 Additional growth models, such as that by Grossman and Helpman (1991), included invention in the growth 
process. 
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Financial capital overaccumulation is possible when production cannot absorb finance in a sustainable 
fashion.  This is demonstrated by speculative bubbles and capital inefficiencies.  One way to state this is 
that if the profit rate of finance is larger than the profit rate of industry, instability will arise since finance 
is overleveraged.   
To some degree, this type of thinking is illustrated in the work of Hyman Minsky, who wrote that finance 
can move from a hedge state, to a speculative state, to Ponzi financing.  Although in reality hedge 
financing can coexist alongside speculative or Ponzi financing, thus making it unclear when one state 
dominates, Minsky provides a vein of thinking similar to that which we emphasize.  Finance is tied to the 
business cycle, with credit expansion being procyclical (Minsky 1991).  As production increases, finance 
moves from hedge to speculative, and a sharp decline in production is associated with Ponzi financing.   
We write in a similar vein.  While logically, an excess creation of machines (physical capital) is possible, 
since the labor supply that can use the machines or purchase their output is limited, an excess of 
financial capital has not been discussed in the literature.  In fact, most economists, both orthodox and 
heterodox, would ask whether it is at all possible to have “too much” financial capital.  We believe 
financial capital can be excessive, and when excessive, pernicious.  But unlike Bello (2006), we do not 
think that the relationship between financial capital and the real sector is direct.  Rather, the real sector 
as it relates to non-bank financial capital is supported by bank financial capital.   
Some models have pursued speculative finance, which is one pathway toward overaccumulation.  For 
example, Caballero, Farhi and Hammour (1994) create a model in which speculative finance, a case in 
which interest rates exceed the growth rate of the economy, can continue to create booming 
investment, but when a speculative growth path crashes, the bubble may also crash.   
Section Three.  Operationalization of hypothesis  
We posit that for any level of economic development, if the growth of finance is less than or equal to 
the growth of production, an increase in financial deepening is necessary.  Conversely, if the growth of 
finance is greater than the growth of production, a decrease in financial deepening is necessary.  This is 
not easy to operationalize, since both financial deepening and production are heterogeneous; there is 
no average representation of either.  We can start with a general hypothesis as follows. 
For any E: 
Where F – P  < kD, F - P must increase; 
where F – P  >  kD, F - P must decrease (for high income countries) or D must increase (for low income 
countries). 
where F is the index of finance, P is the index of production, D is the index of financial deepening, E is 
the level of economic development, and k is a positive parameter.   
We first construct indices for non-bank financial development, production, and financial deepening.  We 
use two equally weighted variables in the financial deepening index D.  The variables representing 
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financial deepening have been used in prior work by King and Levine (1993b ) and include measures of 
liquid liabilities to GDP (DEPTH)5 and gross claims on the private sector to GDP (PRIVY)6, normalizing on 
the smallest data point, Peru in 1990.   
We use our own index to measure non-bank financial development F, including equal weights of the 
ratio of other financial institutions to GDP (OTHER) and stock market capitalization to GDP (STOCK)7, 
normalizing by the smallest data, in this case Uruguay in 1995.    
We also use our own index to measure production P, including equal weights of the Industrial 
Production Index8 and the Agricultural Output Index910.   Since these production index components have 
already been normalized (indexed), we use the composite production index P directly.  We compare 
indices of finance and production to construct a binary variable indicating whether non-bank financial 
development is greater than production.  We note that the correlation between production and non-
bank financial development is negligible, at 32 percent, while the correlation between non-bank 
financial development  and financial deepening is moderate, at 48 percent. 
We then examine the relationship between the difference between non-bank financial development 
and production (the ‘speculative wedge,’ versus financial deepening.  In order to do this, we subtract the 
production index from the non-bank financial development index, and regress this on the financial 
deepening index upon this index as well as other control variables.  Importantly, we note that 
correlation between the speculative wedge and the financial deepening index is low to moderate, not 
high.   
The relationship between the speculative wedge (transformed by adding 200 to make it positive, and 
take the natural log) and the financial deepening index is as follows: 
Figure.  Financial Deepening Index versus Speculative Wedge Transformation 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Data from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). 
6
 PRIVY calculated from IFS 32d/GDP.  We do not use Levine’s measure PRIVATE, which is calculated from IFS 
32d/(32a through 32f, excluding 32e), since there are numerous gaps in the data, limiting the number of 
observations. 
7
 All data for F index from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).  We had, and removed, the indicators public bond 
market capitalization to GDP and bank returns on assets because they were not significant in determining the level 
of economic development (GDP per capita). 
8
 Laspeyres' index number of total value-added in all industrial production, where value added is the value of 
output less the values of both intermediate consumption and consumption of fixed capital. (United Nations, 
annual, Series P). 
9
 Based on the sum of price-weighted quantities of different agricultural commodities produced after deductions 
of quantities used as seed and feed weighted in a similar manner. All the indices at the country, regional, and 
world levels are calculated by the Laspeyres formula. Production quantities of each commodity are weighted by 
average international commodity prices in the base period and summed for each year. To obtain the index, the 
aggregate for a given year is divided by the average aggregate for the base period. The commodities covered in the 
computation of indices of agricultural production are all crops and livestock products originating in each country. 
Practically all products are covered, with the main exception of fodder crops. 
10
 Both the IPI and API are taken from Eurostat. 
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The speculative wedge, by country is as follows: 
 
Figure.  Speculative Wedge by Country 
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The regression equations we use are as follows: 
Constant Coefficients Model 
The constant coefficients model is as follows: 
FIN_PRODit = a1 +  ß1DEEP_IND1it +  ß2GDPPERCAP2it + eit 
Time Fixed Effects Model 
FIN_PRODit = a1 +  λ2Year1977 + λ3Year1978 + …λ32Year2008 + ß1DEEP_IND1it +  ß2GDPPERCAP2it + eit 
The individual year effects are insignificant.  If we group according to 2 or 3 groupings by years (1977-93, 
1994-2008 or 1977-88, 1989-1999, 2000-2008), one grouping (1977-1988) is significant at the 5% level, 
but on the whole these yearly categorizations are not statistically justified using cluster analysis.  If we 
set up an indicator that denotes whether the observation is between 1990 and 1999, when speculative 
markets grew rapidly, the category is significant and justified by cluster analysis.  The regression 
equation looks like this: 
FIN_PRODit = a1 +  λ2YearNineties+ ß1DEEP_IND1it +  ß2GDPPERCAP2it + eit 
Time and Country Fixed Effects Model  
FIN_PRODit = a0 + a1country + a2country +…λ0 +  λ1Year1977 + λ2Year1978 + …λ31Year2008 + 
ß1DEEP_IND1it +  ß2GDPPERCAP2it + eit 
Individual country effects are significant but not meaningful.  We are interested in the differences in 
financial deepening effects of the speculative spread between groups of countries.  Therefore, we divide 
countries into OECD and non-OECD countries.  These categories are statistically justified through cluster 
analysis.  We again use the year classification ‘Nineties.’  Therefore, we arrive at the following regression 
equation: 
FIN_PRODit = a0 + a1OECD + λ2YearNineties+  ß1DEEP_IND1it +  ß2GDPPERCAP2it + eit 
Section Four.  Findings 
 
We first look at the regression results, then turn to country case studies to test the hypothesis. 
Constant Coefficients Model 
FIN_PRODit = a1 +  ß1DEEP_IND1it +  ß2GDPPERCAP2it + eit 
 Parameter 
Estimate 
T Value P Value 
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Intercept -83.55606         -11.03       <.0001 
GDP Per Capita 0.00234      6.89       <.0001 
Financial Deepening 
Index 
8.18343         6.51       <.0001 
N 370 
R2 29% 
Adjusted R2 29% 
F Value 75.26     
Pr > F <.0001 
 
The financial deepening index and GDP per capita are both significant, with the financial deepening 
index having a much greater impact on the speculative index FIN_PROD. 
Time Fixed Effects Model 
The time fixed effects model looks as follows: 
FIN_PRODit = a1 +  λ2YearNineties+ ß1DEEP_IND1it +  ß2GDPPERCAP2it + eit 
 Parameter 
Estimate 
T Value P Value 
Intercept -70.32386         -7.10       <.0001 
GDP Per Capita 0.00253      7.21       <.0001 
Financial Deepening 
Index 
8.12124         6.48       <.0001 
Nineties (1=1990-1999) -18.06534         -2.06       0.0401 
N 370 
R2 30% 
Adjusted R2 29% 
F Value 52.03     
Pr > F <.0001 
 
The financial deepening index and GDP per capita continue to be significant, as was the decade of the 
nineties.  The impact of GDP per capita was again low but still significant. 
Time and Country Fixed Effects Model  
The equation for the time and country fixed effects was as follows: 
FIN_PRODit = a0 + a1OECD + λ2YearNineties+  ß1DEEP_IND1it +  ß2GDPPERCAP2it + eit 
Therefore, we have: 
 Parameter T Value P Value 
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Estimate 
Intercept -69.39916        -6.88       <.0001 
GDP Per Capita 0.00266      6.02       <.0001 
Financial Deepening 
Index 
8.08247         6.43       <.0001 
Nineties (1=1990-1999) -18.38728         -2.09       0.0374 
OECD (1=OECD) -4.47935         -0.50       0.6149 
N 370 
R2 30% 
Adjusted R2 29% 
F Value 29.01 
Pr > F <.0001 
 
OECD is not significant, while the financial deepening index, GDP per capita, and the nineties period 
continue to be significant.  The impact of GDP per capita on the speculative spread is again low. 
But this analysis is not the whole story.  Our hypothesis was as follows:  
 
For any E: 
Where F – P  < kD, F - P must increase; 
where F – P  >  kD, F - P must decrease (for high income countries) or D must increase (for low income 
countries). 
where F is the index of finance, P is the index of production, D is the index of financial deepening, E is 
the level of economic development, and k is a positive parameter.    
We have found that there is a close relationship between financial deepening (banking development) 
and the speculative wedge (non-bank financial development over and beyond production).  In addition, 
economic development as measured by GDP per capita is important, but the impact of GDP per capita 
on the speculative wedge (the regression coefficient) is close to zero.  The nineties time period, but not 
the country grouping (OECD) matters as a control variable. 
Have we arrived at the conclusion of our hypothesis?  Not yet.  We incorporate a crisis indicator to 
identify crisis countries and years.  We found this to be insignificant in our regression.  Speculation may 
really occur just before a crisis, but even looking at this indicator we find it to be insignificant in 
regression analysis. 
Hence we use a more primitive method of analysis to look at patterns in the data.  Using a rough 
estimate of the financial deepening coefficient per the regression analysis (close to 8), and subtracting 
the intercept from the dependent variable, we examine numbers that demonstrate the trends of the 
speculative wedge and the financial deepening index*8.   
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First, we divide the countries into low, middle, and high income countries by the most recent World 
Bank categorization (based on GDP per capita in recent years).   
 
Representing low income countries is Nigeria.  Lower middle income countries include Jordan, Peru, 
Philippines, and Tunisia, while upper middle income countries include Brazil, Fiji, Mexico, Argentina, 
Chile, Malaysia and South Africa.   High income countries include Norway, Canada, Korea, Singapore, 
Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States.  Graphs of the financial deepening and speculative 
wedge indices are shown in the Appendix. 
 
Of the countries listed below, the following countries have been through financial crises:  Philippines 
(mild participation in Asian Crisis 1997-99), Brazil (eighties debt crisis 1982-89, Asian financial crisis 
1998), Mexico (eighties debt crisis starting 1982, 1994 peso crisis), Norway (banking crisis 1988-93), 
Korea (Asian crisis 1997-99), Argentina (eighties debt crisis 1982-89, Argentine crisis 2000-1), Chile 
(eighties debt crisis 1982-89), Malaysia (Asian crisis 1997-99), Singapore (mild participation in Asian 
Crisis 1997-99), Sweden (banking crisis 1991-93), and the United States (2008 to present).   
 
Country Years 
covered 
Excess 
speculation 
years 
Crisis years Average 
excess 
speculation, 
over all 
years 
covered 
Average 
excess 
speculation 
during 
excess 
spec. years 
Average excess 
speculation 
during two 
years 
preceding 
crises 
Argentina 1988-2008 1988, 1990-91, 
2000-03 
1982-89, 
2000-01 
-1 28 -18 
Brazil 1992-2007 2007 1982-89, 
1998 
-15 3.78 -9 
Canada 1989-2006 Entire covered 
period 
None 37 37 N/A 
Chile 1989-2008 Entire covered 
period 
1982-89 40 40 Insufficient 
data 
Fiji 1995-2008 None None -35 None N/A 
Jordan 1979-2000 1979-91, 1993-
94, 1996-99 
None 16 50 N/A 
Korea 1977-2005 1977-2000 1997-99 38 48 53 
Malaysia 1978-1994 Entire covered 
period 
1997-99 65 65 221 (in 1994) 
Mexico 1998-2008 None 1982-89, 
1994 
-20 None Insufficient 
data 
Nigeria 1978-1992 1978-1990 None 17 21 N/A 
Norway 1989-2003 Entire covered 
period 
1988-93 17 17 Insufficient 
data 
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Peru 1990-2008 1990-96, 2008 None -4 13 N/A 
Philippines 1977-1995 Entire covered 
period 
1997-99 35 35 50 
 
Singapore 1995-2008 1995-2007 1997-99 74 82 78 
South Africa 1989-2008 Entire covered 
period 
None 201 201 N/A 
Sweden 1989-2008 Entire covered 
period 
1991-93 90 90 72 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1989-2008 1989-91, 1997-
99, 2004-05, 
2007 
None 2 14 N/A 
Tunisia 1993-2008 None None -46 None N/A 
United 
States 
1989-2008 Entire covered 
period 
2008 182 182 227 
 
We find that for crisis countries, pre-crisis data in which the excess speculation index is higher than the 
average excess speculation is often telling, and sometimes not.  The analysis works in the cases of Brazil, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and the United States, but does not work in the cases of 
Argentina and Sweden.  The case for application of this index is greatest in countries in which the pre-
crisis excess speculation index is greater than the average for non-crisis excess speculation years, as in 
the cases of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the United States, but not for Argentina, Brazil, 
Singapore and Sweden.  Hence, given our constrained data availability, the excess speculation spread 
can predict crisis about half of the time when crises occur.  The excess speculation spread can be a 
warning signal during periods of excess speculation and no crisis—crisis may not occur but is possible.  
This has been true for all of the countries except Fiji, Mexico, and Tunisia.  Thus the excess speculation 
spread is prone to alerting to false positives.  
 
Finally, we ask, is this type of analysis useful?  In its crude form, with a lack of data, the excess 
speculation index appears that it may be useful in predicting crises for countries when used with other 
indicators that can determine risk.  However, simply avoiding crisis should be the weakest goal of 
economic policy; maintaining a strong, vibrant and stable economy should be the strongest.  In the 
latter case, in our judgment the excess speculation index can serve as a guide in determining whether to 
curb speculative activity or to increase the level of financial deepening in order to maintain speculative 
activity.  For when speculative activity crashes, it is the banking and monetary institutions that are 
forced to stabilize economic activity.  Therefore financial deepening can be thought of as a base from 
which economic activity and speculative (riskier) financial activity can be built.  
 
This latter analysis lacks elegance but in future research shall be refined.  For now, we simply make the 
case that financial capital can lead to overaccumulation in the form of speculation, which creates the 
possibility that economic instability will occur.  When the speculative wedge greatly exceeds the 
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financial deepening index, either speculation must be reduced, or financial (bank) deepening must occur 
in order to stabilize the economy.   
 
Section Five.  Conclusion 
 
We construct a model that states where there is excess speculation over production and financial 
deepening, policy must strive to decrease speculation or increase financial deepening.  This represents 
financial capital overaccumulation.  In the converse case, there is financial capital underaccumulation 
and there is more room for speculative activity in the form of non-bank financing.  Future research shall 
refine the methodology used in this paper to streamline and make rigorous the argument for financial 
overaccumulation.  However, we have put forth a case for financial overaccumulation that has been 
lacking in the literature.  
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